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L JURISDICTION. 
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(2001), based on the Supreme Court's transfer of this case to the Court of Appeals under 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) (2001). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
A. Issues Presented For Review. 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court correctly rule, as a matter of law, that the parties' 
"Broker-Sales Executive Contract/Independent Contractor Agreement" ("Agency 
Agreement")1 entitles Young to a sales commission only to the extent Wardley actually 
receives the commission from the underlying transaction? 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court correctly rule, as a matter of law, that the Agency 
Agreement does not expressly or impliedly require Wardley to pursue every means 
possible to recover the unpaid commission from the parties to the underlying transaction? 
B. Standard Of Review. 
"In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, 'we review the 
court's legal decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and review "the facts and 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."'" Brockbank v. 
Brockbank, 2001 UT App 251, ^  10, 32 P.3d 990, citing, Booth v. Attorney's Title Guar. 
Fund, 2001 UT 13, ^ 28, 20 P.3d 319 (citations omitted). A court may interpret and 
apply a contract on a motion for summary judgment when the terms are "complete, clear, 
1
 A copy of the Agency Agreement is attached as Appendix A. 
1 
and unambiguous." Aspenwood, LLC v. C.A.T., LLC, 2003 UT App 28, % 30, 73 P.3d 
947; Smith v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT App 361, \ 18, 58 P.3d 854, cert denied, 64 P.3d 
586 (Utah 2003). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). A trial court's decision that a contract is 
unambiguous is reviewed for "correctness, giving no particular deference to the trial 
court's conclusions of law." Plateau Mining Co. v. State Division of Lands, 802 P.2d 
720, 728 (Utah 1990). 
TTT STATEMENT OF CASE. 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
This case involves a dispute between a real estate agent (Young) and her principal 
broker (Wardley) over a sales commission. As Young notes, her appeal presents a 
"unique" and largely unprecedented claim that a commission is owed even on amounts 
that "were never collected by [the broker]." Brief of Appellant at 3. Wardley asserts that 
under the clear terms of the Agency Agreement, it is obligated to pay a commission only 
to the extent it is actually collected from the proceeds of the underlying transaction. 
Young asserts that Wardley's payment obligation is essentially unlimited, extending even 
to amounts that Wardley never receives. 
B, Course Of The Proceedings Below. 
Both Young's initial complaint and amended complaint allege that she "was 
entitled to be paid 80% of each commission received by Wardley and, in fact, was paid 
such percentage by Wardley." R. 2, 538 [Cmplt. at 2, [^6; Am. Cmplt at 2, ^|6]. 
{Emphasis added). These allegations are consistent with several provisions of the 
2 
Agency Agreement, which provide that Wardley's obligation to pay, and Young's right 
to receive, commissions is limited to amounts that Wardley actually collects from the 
underlying sales transaction. Appendix A, fflf 8, 9, 16, and unnumbered section entitled 
"In-House-Commission" at 4. 
In an effort to avoid the Agency Agreement's provisions that a commission is 
owed only to the extent it is actually collected in the underlying transaction, Young's two 
complaints assert claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, alleging that Wardley "fail[ed] to take reasonable efforts to 
collect the commission from [various parties to the underlying sale transaction]." 
R. 9, 10, 546, 547 [Crnplt at 9, 10, ffif 41, 48; Am. Cmplt. at 10, 11, ffi[ 42, 50]. 
C. Disposition In The Court Below. 
In 2004, the trial court granted Wardley's two motions for partial summary 
judgment. In a ruling dated February 12, 2004 ("Ruling I"), the court summarily 
dismissed Young's claims that Wardley had failed to adequately pursue the balance of 
Young's commission from the parties to the underlying transaction. R. 495-97. The 
court reasoned that Young's "claims that Wardley did not do enough to pursue 
commissions must fail, because the language of the [Agency Agreement] places all rights 
and duties with regard to such actions in the hands of [Wardley]." Id. 
In an order dated November 2, 2004 ("Ruling II"),3 the trial court summarily 
dismissed Young's claim that she was entitled to recover a commission beyond "the 
2
 A copy of Ruling I is attached as Appendix B. 
3 
actual amount of property yielded or the amount of commission [actually] received by 
Wardley." R. 805-07. The court ruled that "the four corners of the Agency Agreement 
unambiguously and plainly limit [Young's] commission to a percentage of the actual 
amount received from the seller at closing and not a percentage of an amount previously 
expected by [Young]." Id. 
Trial was then conducted on Young's remaining claim that she had been underpaid 
on the portion of the commission that Wardley actually received. R. 1142-97. Young 
was awarded $46,000 plus interest and attorney fees on this claim. R. 1198-99. 
D. Statement Of Facts Relevant To Issues Presented For Review, 
1. Wardley and Young entered into the Agency Agreement in 1992. Appendix 
A at 3. 
2. The Agency Agreement has several provisions confirming that Wardley's 
obligation to pay commissions to Young is limited to amounts actually received from the 
seller in the underlying transaction. Id- 1fl[ 8, 9, 16, and unnumbered section entitled "In-
House-Commission" at 4. Specifically, the Agency Agreement states in relevant part: 
(a) "Division and payment of commissions, fees and commission 
bonuses shall be in accordance with [Wardley's] 'Annual Graduated Commission 
Schedule for Realtors' attached hereto and incorporated on page 4. Division and 
distribution of earned commissions shall take place as soon as practical after collection of 
3
 A copy of Ruling II is attached as Appendix C. 
4 
such commissions from the party or parties for whom the services have been performed." 
Id. |^ 8. {Emphasis added). 
(b) "[Young] receive[s] the percentage shown of the total commission 
received by [Wardley]." Id. at p. 4. {Emphasis added). 
(c) "In no case shall [Wardley] be personally liable to [Young] for any 
commission, nor shall [Young] be personally liable to [Wardley] for any commissions; 
but when the commission shall have been collected from the party or parties for whom 
the service was performed, [Wardley] shall hold the same in trust, to be divided 
according to the terms of this agreement." Id. ^ 9. {Emphasis added). 
(d) If the Agency Agreement is terminated, the agent is entitled to a 
commission only if the underlying transaction closes before the termination date "and 
[Wardley] shall have been paid a commission therefor, prior to the date of termination." 
Id. at 16. {Emphasis added). 
3. Young's complaints allege that she "was entitled to be paid 80% of each 
commission received by Wardley and, in fact, was paid such percentage by Wardley." 
R. 2, 538 [Cmplt. at 2, ^ ; Am. Cmplt. at 2, ^[6]. {Emphasis added). 
4. The Agency Agreement states that Wardley is the sole owner of, and is the 
only party empowered to enforce, property listings and commission claims: 
(a) "[Young] acknowledges that [Wardley] is the sole owner of all 
listings, rights and claims arising or in connection with the real property transactions 
which are the subject hereof and documentation relating thereto...In the event of a 
dispute with a third party concerning payment of any commission, [Wardley] shall have 
5 
the sole right to negotiate any settlement or to take, or defend any legal actions." Id. ^ 11. 
(Emphasis added). 
(b) "[Wardley] shall have the sole right to cancel a listing or release a 
seller from a listing contract on any property at any time by written notice to [Young] and 
the seller." Id If 11. (Emphasis added). 
5. The seller of the Chateau Apartments agreed, pre-closing, to pay a four 
percent (4%) commission on the sales price-a total commission of $316,000. R. 623, 
624. 
6. At the closing on the sale, the seller and the buyer decided unilaterally to 
reduce the commission to $150,000. R. 626. 
7. While Young protested the reduction, she "did not take any action, 
including judicial action, to protect [herself or Wardley] by preventing the escrow agent 
from paying the unpaid portion to the seller and the buyer." Brief of Appellant at 5, ^ j 4. 
8. Wardley attempted to recover the unpaid commission by filing suit against 
the seller, obtaining a default judgment for the full claimed amount, registering the 
judgment in the seller's home state, and conducting an asset search. R. 153, 154, 181-95. 
9. Young provided no expert testimony to support her claim that Wardley's 
efforts to collect the commission shortfall were unreasonable or otherwise deficient. 
6 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 
The Agency Agreement is the written repository of the parties' rights and 
obligations for the payment of commissions. It repeatedly and unmistakably states that 
Wardley's obligation to pay, and Young's right to receive, such commissions is 
dependent upon the seller's actual payment of the commission from the proceeds of the 
underlying transaction. No fewer that four provisions of the Agency Agreement, as well 
as a key allegation in Young's own complaints, confirm this reality. The trial court 
properly interpreted the Agency Agreement as written in dismissing Young's claim to 
make Wardley an absolute guarantor of payment. 
The trial court, moreover, correctly dismissed Young's claim that Wardley was 
contractually obligated to do more than it did to recover the commission shortfall from 
the seller in the underlying transaction. The court's dismissal should be affirmed because 
(1) the Agency Agreement vested Wardley with all rights to potential commissions, (2) 
Wardley vigorously attempted to collect the commission shortfall from the seller, and (3) 
Young adduced no expert or other testimony to establish that the collection efforts were 
in any way deficient. 
None of the Utah or other cases that Young cites can be used to alter the intended 
effect of the Agency Agreement. Because Wardley and Young expressly agreed to the 
terms and conditions on which Young would receive her commission, the Agency 




A. Young Is Bound By The Terms Of The Contract She Signed, And 
Wardley Is Entitled To Have It Enforced As Written. 
Young is bound by the unambiguous terms of the Agency Agreement, which 
repeatedly states that her right to receive, and Wardley's obligation to pay, commissions 
extends only to amounts that are actually collected from the underlying transaction. "In 
Utah, contracts mean what they say, and parties will be bound by them." Russ v. 
Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901, 906 n.l (Utah App. 1995). Thus, "it is [a] court's 
duty to enforce the intentions of the parties as expressed in the plain language of the 
[contract's] covenants." Holladay Duplex Management Co. v. Howells, 2002 UT App. 
125, Tf 2, 47 P.3d 104, 106 (quoting Swenson v. Erickson, 998 P.2d 807, 812 (Utah 
2000)). Through this decisional process, "[e]ach contract provision is to be considered in 
relation to all the others, with a view to giving effect to all and ignoring none." Plateau 
Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Land and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). 
"If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, then a 
court does not resort to extrinsic evidence of the contract's meaning, and a court 
determines the parties' intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a 
matter of law." Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, f 16, 52 P.3d 1179. 
A court may grant summary judgment enforcing a contract when the contract terms are 
"complete, clear, and unambiguous." Aspenwood, L.L.C. v. C.A.T., L.L.C, 2003 UT 
App. 28, P 0 , 73 P.3d 947; Smith v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT App. 361, 1J18, 58 P.3d 854, 
cert, denied, 64 P.3d 586 (Utah 2003). 
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The trial court faithfully applied these principles in Ruling I and Ruling II. In 
Ruling I, it determined that Wardley, as the sole owner of the listing contract and the 
gross sales commission under the contract, see Appendix A at ^ 11, 13, adequately 
performed its obligation, if any, to attempt to collect the commission shortfall from the 
seller. R. 495-97. Wardley did so by filing suit against the seller, obtaining a default 
judgment for the full claimed amount, registering the judgment in California, and 
conducting an exhaustive asset search. Brief of Appellant at 5, \ 4; R. 153, 154, 181-95. 
Young adduced no expert testimony to suggest, let alone establish, that Wardley's efforts 
to collect the commission were unreasonable or otherwise deficient. 
The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that Wardley did not breach the Agency 
Agreement because (1) its plain terms endowed Wardley with sole ownership of the 
listing, and with exclusive discretion to decide whether and to what extent to pursue 
collection of any claimed commission, (2) Wardley undertook extensive efforts to collect 
the disputed commission from the seller, and (3) Young offered no evidence that the 
collection efforts did not comply with industry or other applicable standards. 
Ruling II is similarly unassailable. There, the trial court correctly interpreted the 
unambiguous terms of the Agency Agreement to limit Wardley5s duty to pay, and 
Young's right to receive, a commission only to amounts actually received by Wardley. 
R. 805-07. In the court's words, "the four corners of the Agency Agreement 
unambiguously and plainly limit [Young's] commission to a percentage of the actual 
amount received from the seller at closing and not a percentage of an amount previously 
9 
expected by [Young]." Id.4 
This determination is anything but the "strained construction" that Young 
suggests. Brief of Appellant at 9. It is, rather, the product of a sensible, straightforward 
interpretation of the plain language of the Agency Agreement. Indeed, at least four 
provisions of the Agency Agreement confirm the parties' intent that Young's receipt of 
her net commission was dependent upon Wardley's receipt of the gross commission 
proceeds from the underlying transaction. Specifically, paragraph 8 of the Agency 
Agreement states that Young's receipt of her commission cannot and does not occur until 
"collection" of the commission from the proceeds of the underlying sale. Appendix A, ^ 
8. This provision is reiterated in the "In-House-Commission" provision on page 4 of the 
Agency Agreement: "[Young] receive[s] the percentage shown of the total commission 
received by [Wardley]." IdL at 4. (Emphasis added). 
The reality that Wardley's actual receipt of the gross commission from the seller is 
the sine qua non of its duty to pay Young's net commission is fortified by paragraph 9 of 
the Agency Agreement. Id. at 9. It states that Wardley has no liability to Young for 
"any" commission until it has been "collected." Finally, paragraph 16 of the Agency 
Agreement confirms that absent Wardley's receipt of the gross commission amount, 
Young has no right to payment of her net commission. It addresses the circumstances 
under which Young could receive a commission in the event of her temiination as a 
4
 The court's ruling is consistent with Young's own allegation that she "was entitled to be 
paid 80% of each commission received by Wardley." R. 2, 538. (Emphasis added). 
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Wardley agent, stating that she is entitled to a commission only to the extent Wardley 
"ha[s] been paid," i.e., received the commission before the termination date. Id. at 16. 
These provisions, both individually and collectively, reflect the parties' unmistakable 
intent that until and unless Wardley collects or otherwise receives the commission 
amount from the seller, Wardley has no obligation to pay a commission to Young. This 
is especially true in light of Young's concession in her complaints that she is entitled to 
"80% of each commission received by Wardley." R. 2, 538. {Emphasis added). 
The trial court properly rejected Young's summary judgment position that these 
provisions merely define when the commission is to be paid and not how much is to be 
received. Its conclusion, as reflected in Ruling II, is firmly rooted in the unambiguous 
language of the Agency Agreement. If, as Young suggests, paragraph 8 of the 
Agreement were read in isolation without reference to the three other provisions that 
define the scope of Wardley's obligation to pay commissions, it could be interpreted to 
speak only to the timing of when the commission is to be paid, and not to the amount that 
is owed. Such an approach, however, is not permitted by Utah law. In interpreting a 
contract, the court "look[s] to the writing itself to ascertain the parties' intentions, and [] 
considers] each contract provision... in relation to all of the others, with a view toward 
giving effect to all and ignoring none." WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 
2002 UT 88, Tfl8, 54 P.3d 1139, 1144. 
Utah law, therefore, requires that all of the commission provisions of the Agency 
Agreement be considered together. They include the "In-House-Commission" provision 
on page 4 of the Agency Agreement that "[Young] receive[s] the percentage shown of the 
11 
total commission received by Wardley." Appendix A at 4. {Emphasis added). They 
include the paragraph 9 provision that "in no case" is Wardley liable to Young for "any 
commission" until it is "collected" from the proceeds of the underlying transaction. Id. f 
9. And they include the paragraph 16 provision that if Young is terminated as a Wardley 
agent, she is entitled to a commission only to the extent Wardley "ha[s] been paid a 
commission therefor." Id. \ 16. Young's obsessive, myopic focus on paragraph 8 to the 
exclusion of these other provisions of the Agency Agreement runs afoul of Utah law. 
WebBank, 54 P.3d at 1144; Plateau Mining Co., 802 P.2d at 725. 
The trial court correctly interpreted and enforced the many sections of the Agency 
Agreement that expressly make Wardley's obligation to pay commissions contingent 
upon actual receipt of the commission amount from the underlying sale. Young's 
assertion to this Court that "there is simply no clause or provision in the [Agency] 
Agreement between Wardley and Young which is designed for the purpose of defining or 
limiting the amount of commissions earned to the amount received by Wardley," Brief dX 
15, is demonstrably wrong. 
B. The Agency Agreement's Express Covenant Or Condition That 
Wardley Owes Commissions To Young Only To The Extent They Are Collected 
From The Underlying Sale Cannot Be Trumped By Cases That Interpret And 
Enforce Entirely Different Contract Language. 
Because the Agency Agreement is enforceable as written, Young is precluded by 
Utah law from evading the Agreement's intended effect through judicial tinkering. "The 
court will not rewrite a contract to supply terms which the parties omitted." Hal Taylor 
12 
Assoc, v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). Courts are not "obligated 
to rewrite contracts entered into by parties dealing at arms' length, to relieve one party 
from a bargain later regretted, simply on supposed equitable principles." Webb v. R.O.A. 
General Inc., 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 1991). 
None of the Utah or Michigan cases that Young cites are remotely applicable to 
the enforceability of the Agency Agreement at issue in this appeal. Specifically, the Utah 
cases—Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 94 P.3d 292 
(Utah 2004), Robert Langston, LTD. v. McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554 (Utah App. 1987), and 
Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983)~resolved commission 
disputes between the selling broker, on the one hand, and the seller, on the other. These 
cases did not involve commission disputes between the broker and its agent under their 
agency contract. Rather, they simply applied the settled principle that unless the parties 
choose to condition the broker's right to a commission on anything other than procuring a 
ready, willing and able buyer, the listing contract must be enforced as written and cannot 
be expanded or limited to cover or exclude a contingency that was never agreed upon. 
Because the listing agreements at issue in those cases had none of the provisions found in 
13 
the Agency Agreement here, Young's reliance on them is misplaced.5 
Indeed, the Agency Agreement, unlike the listing contracts there, contains an 
express condition to Wardley's obligation to pay, and Young's right to receive, a 
commission: the collection and receipt by Wardley of the sale proceeds necessary to pay 
the commission. "Whether a promise is conditional depends upon the parties' intent, 
which is derived from a fair and reasonable construction of the language used in light of 
all the circumstances when the parties executed the contract." Commercial Union Assoc. 
v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 38 (Utah App. 1993). Express conditions precedent must be 
enforced as written: "Generally speaking neither of the parties, nor the court, has any 
right to ignore or modify conditions which are clearly expressed merely because it may 
subject one of the parties to hardship, but they must be enforced 'in accordance with the 
intentions as...manifested by the language used by the parties to the contract.'" 
5
 This is one of the reasons that the Michigan case Young invokes— Abraham v. Walter 
Neller Co., 172 N.W.2d 817 (Mich. App. 1969)---is inapposite. The only language in the 
parties' contract in that case that even arguably suggested that the broker's obligation to 
compensate its agent was contingent upon the broker's receipt of the commission from 
the seller was the statement that the commission was to be paid "as soon as [it] has been 
collected by the broker." 172 N.W. 2d at 819. The parties' contract there was devoid of 
the additional language found in paragraphs 9 and 16, and in the "In-House-Commission" 
section on page 4 of the Agency Agreement at issue here. Moreover, unlike Abraham, 
where the broker "by choice failfed] to collect its commission," id. at 819, it was Young 
who chose to allow the closing to occur and who failed to "prevent[] the escrow agent 
from paying the unpaid portion to the seller and the buyer." Brief of Appellant at 5, ^ 4. 
Finally, the broker in Abraham, unlike Wardley here, R. 153, 154, 181-95, took no action 
to attempt to collect the commission. 
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Commercial Union Assoc, 863 P.2d at 38 (quoting Jones v. Acme Bldg. Prods., Inc., 450 
P.2d 743,746(1969)). 
Paragraphs 8, 9 and 16, together with the "In-House-Commission" provision on 
page 4 of the Agency Agreement, plainly condition Young's right to receive her net 
commission on Wardley's actual receipt of the gross commission from the proceeds of 
the sale. The trial court's decision in Ruling II that the Agency Agreement "limit[s] 
[Young's] commission to a percentage of the actual amount received from the seller at 
closing and not a percentage of an amount previously expected by [Young]" properly 
honors the parties' express condition, as required by Utah law. 
Finally, Reed v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 61 P. 21 (Utah 1900) does not benefit 
Young. In that case, the principal actively and intentionally effected the cancellation of 
an insurance policy that its agent had procured. 61 P. at 23. The principal did so not only 
to terminate its obligation under the policy, but to extinguish its agent's right to 
commissions on account of future premiums paid over time. Id. By contrast, in the case 
at bar Wardley undertook extensive efforts to collect the commission from the seller, 
doing so primarily for the benefit of its agent (Young) through the 80/20 split established 
by the Agency Agreement. Wardley, therefore, did not "dispose of [its] own right to 
receive the fund, and thus deprive the agent of the reward for [her] service," as happened 
in Reed. Indeed, it was Young, not Wardley, who had the first and last clear chance to 
instruct the escrow agent not to close the transaction unless and until the seller paid the 
entire commission that Young was expecting to receive. See Brief of Appellant at 5, J^ 4. 
Wardley's diligent enforcement efforts—to vigorously attempt to collect the commission 
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after Young allowed the sale to close without insisting that the seller pay the agreed-upon 
commission—bear no resemblance to the mercenary principal who was ordered to pay up 
in Reed. Reed cannot be used to rewrite the Agency Agreement to make Wardley an 
absolute guarantor of the commission obligation. 
C. There Are No Disputed Issues Of Material Fact That Need To Be 
Adjudicated. 
After the trial court denied Young's motion for summary judgment, a jury trial 
was conducted to determine what amount, if any, beyond the $56,400 that Young had 
already received, was still owed. The jury determined that the additional owed amount 
was $46,000 plus interest and attorney fees. R. 1198-99. In the face of that award, 
Young suggests that "there are also facts which came out at trial that support Young's 
position that Wardley owed her an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing." Brief of 
Appellant at 25. Young, however, nowhere identifies or cites to any general category of 
facts, let alone specific evidence, that "came out at trial." Her failure to identify these 
claimed facts is fatal to her attempt to have Ruling I and Ruling II reversed. 
Young further suggests that "there are also substantial questions and disputes of 
fact over what Wardley did at the time of closing, and after, and whether Wardley 
discharged or breached its contractual duty to Young." Brief of Appellant at 24, 25. 
Again, however, these facts are not identified. Assuming arguendo that they refer to 
those set forth in paragraphs 20(a)-(d) at pages 8 and 9 of Young's brief, they are not 
material for at least three reasons: (1) paragraphs 11 and 13 of the Agency Agreement 
conferred on Wardley sole ownership of the listing, and exclusive discretion to decide 
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whether and to what extent to pursue collection of any claimed commission, Appendix A, 
H 11, (2) Wardley undertook significant efforts to collect the disputed commission from 
the seller, R. 153, 154, 181-95, and (3) Young failed to adduce any expert testimony to 
suggest or establish that the collection efforts were somehow deficient. These phantom, 
purportedly disputed material facts are not a basis for reversing either Ruling I or Ruling 
II. 
D. Young Has Failed To Demonstrate How The Agency Agreement Is 
Supposedly Ambiguous. 
Young's final argument is fatally superficial. She asserts, with no reference to any 
word, phrase or provision of the Agency Agreement, that the Agreement is conditionally 
ambiguous. Brief of Appellant at 25. An ambiguity does not arise simply because the 
parties to a contract offer alternative interpretations. Peterson v. Sunrise Corp., 2002 UT 
43,1J19, 48 P.3d 918, 925 (Utah 2000). Obviously, Young's failure to even identify the 
contract language deemed to be ambiguous, let alone offer a plausible alternative 
interpretation, precludes appellate review of the issue. Snow Flower Homeowners Ass 'n 
v. Snow Flower, LTD., 2001 UT App. 207, 31 P.3d 576, 580; Christensen v. Munns, 812 
P.2d 69, 73 (Utah App. 1991). 
VI. CONCLUSION. 
The trial court accurately interpreted, as a matter of law, the unambiguous terms 
and conditions of the Agency Agreement. 
Ruling I, which rejected Young's claim that Wardley was contractually obligated 
to do more than it did to collect the commission from the seller, should be affirmed 
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because (1) the Agency Agreement's plain terms vest Wardley with sole ownership of the 
listing, and with exclusive discretion to decide whether and to what extent to pursue 
collection of any claimed commission, (2) Wardley undertook extensive efforts to collect 
the disputed commission from the seller, and (3) Young offered no evidence that the 
collection efforts did not comply with industry or other applicable standards. 
Ruling II, which enforced the Agency Agreement's many provisions that Young's 
right to receive a commission is no broader than Wardley's ability to collect it, should 
also be affirmed. The trial court's interpretation of the clear language of the Agency 
Agreement conforms fully with settled Utah case law. 
DATED: August 3 > , 2007. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
John T. Anderson 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of the law firm Anderson & Karrenberg, 50 
West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that on the Xfr- day of August, 
2007, I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to 
be served, via first class mail, postage prepaid, upon: 
Delano S. Findlay 
Findlaw, LLC 
684 East Vine Street #3 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
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Q C v I f n y l ^ y H§fness 
BROKER-SALES EXECUTIVF CONTRACT 
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AGREEMENT 
This AGRFFMENT is mado and entered Into this J^Lfl __ . day of _ L.^lQ^K^j^ by and between WARDLEY BETTER HOMES AND GARDENS, 
^ "(V i Vj 7 
(hereinafter referred to as "Broker") and _ / \ \ ^ v * \ U U \ Q U \ \ C i (hereinafter tB^ened to as -Sales Executive") 
WITNESSETH 
Wl ICRrAS, the brokor is now and for many yoars has been ongagod in business as a gonoral roal ostato brokor in the state of Utah, is quad Hod to and doos operato a 
general real estate business and procures the listings of real estato for sale, lease or rental, and enjoys the good will of, and a reputation for fair doaJing with the public and 
Wl IEREAS, the Brokor maintains an office in the city specified on page 3 (and roforrod to herein as the "office"), equipped with furnishings and other oqulpmont for the 
purposo of oporation of its bi/sinoss and stnffod with clerical ornployoes to sorvico the public as a real ostato brokor, and 
Wl IERCAS Sales Executive Is engaged in business as a roal estate Salos Executive and holds a licenso issued by the State ol Utah Dopartmont of Businoss Regula-
tions Real Estate Division and 
WHrREAS the parties horoto consider it to bo to the mutual advantage of the parties to enter into this Contract upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth 
NOW I I ILREfORF, in consideration of the mutual covenants and piomisos hoiom contained it Is agreed and statod as follows 
1 Sales Executive agrees to proceed diligently with his/her best ellorts to soil, trado lease or rent real estate listed with the Broker, to solicit additional listings and 
customers lor Broker, and otherwise to promote the business of serving the public in teal estato transactions to the end that each of the parties hereto may derive the greatest 
possible benefit During any period that Sales Executive cannot perform his/her real estate activities as a full time independent contractor. Sales Executive agroes to solicit 
and co list listings with another lull time independent contractor approved by the broker or Office M.mager until such time that the Broker or Manager determines that 
customers o( the Brokor can be sorvod fully ttnei professionally by the less than full time Sales rxocutivo and approves in writing that the Salos Exocutive does not havo to co 
list with another lull time Sales Executive 
2 Sales Executivo and Broker each agree to conduct thoir business and regulate their habits and working hours so as to maintain and increase the goodwill, business, 
profits and reputation of the Broker and the Sales Executive To that end Sales Executive agrees to attend the Broker s Training Program, if required by the brokor, and to use 
his/her best efforts to become familiar with the Broker s training materials provided to the Sales Executive in connection with that program In addition Sales Executive agrees 
to maintain a familiarity with and working knowledge of the rules and regulations of the Real Estate Commission of the State of Utah, the Nalionnl Association of Realtors 
Utah Association of Realtors, and the applicable local Board of Realtors and Ml S Sorvico Sales Executive agrees to be completely knowledgeable of and to conduct his/her 
business in accordance with the Code of Ethics of the National Association of Realtors 
3 Broker agrees to make available to Sales Executive on a non exclusive basis, all current listings of the office, except such as the Broker for valid and usual business 
reason*, may oxcludo 
4 Broker agrees, upon roquost, to assist the Sales Executive's work by giving advice and Instructions and to provide full cooporntion In every way roasonnbly possible 
5 Broker agroos that the Sales Executive may share with other Salos Executives, on a non exclusive and non-discriminatory basis all of the facilities of the office which 
shall be providod at Brokor s expense 
6 Sales Executive agreos to make every effort to participate in activities reasonably scheduled by the Broker (or Sales Executives In the office where the Sales 
Executive works Sales Executive understands and agreos thai his/her activities shall be subject to supervision of the Manager and/or Broker in the Office where the Sales 
Executivo works 
7 The commissions and fees for services rondorod on the sale, rontal, trade or base of real estate shall be those set forth on the Listing Commission Schedule', 
shown on page 3 In no event shall the Salos Executive agree to charge loss than the commission or fee established by the Broker without a prior written agreement onterod 
into between the Sales Executive and the Broker to that effect If the Brokor shall have enterod into a special contract or agreement pertaining to any transaction the Brokor 
shall so advise the Sales Executive Salos Executive will read, understand, and agree to abide by, the Antitrust Compliance Policies' of the Broker, a copy of which Is 
includod on page 3 
8 Division and payment of commissions, fees and commission bonuses shall be in accordance with the Broker's Annual Graduated Commission Schedule for Realtors* 
attached hereto and incorporated on page 4 Division and distribution of earned commissions shall take place as soon as practical after collection of such commissions from 
the party or parties for whom the services have boen performod Brokor s Annual Graduated Commission Schedule for Realtors' will be published as of July 1 of each year or 
as soon thereafter as changes occur In the event of special arrangements when a special division of commission may apply, such rate of division will be agreed to In advance 
and in wnting by the Broker and the Sales Executive 
9. In the event that two or more Salos Executives under contract with the Drokor have overlapping or conflicting claims with respect to a commission, tho amount of the 
commission, over and above the Broker's share, shall be dividod among the participating Sales Executives according to a mutual agreement. In the event those Salos 
Executives cannot agree to such a division, the division shall bo through/by arbitration under the rules and regulations of the American Arbitration Association; and payment 
therefore, shall be payable from the disputed Sales Executives' commission. In no case shall Broker be personally liabio to Sales Executive for any commission, nor shall 
Sales Executive be personally liable to said Broker lor any commissions; but when the commission shall have been collected from the party or parlies for whom the service 
was performed, Broker shall hold the same In trust, to be dividod according to tho terms of this agrooment. 
10. In the event the Sales Executive acquires property as a principal or sells property owned or partially owned by tho Salos Executive, those transactions shall be 
acquirod through Wardloy Better Homos and Gardens as tho Broker and listed for sale through Wardley Bettor f lomos and Gardens as the Broker. For one salo and/or one 
purchase of the Sales Executive's principal residence per year, in addition to the Salos Executive's established commission. Salos Executive will also recoive one half of the 
Broker's commission up to a maximum of 80% of the total commission recoived by Wardley Better I tomes and Gardens. If the Sales Executive wishes to acquiro an unlisted 
property where no listing commission Is to be paid, the Sales Executive shall submit the offer Ji^ sj to the Broker, which offer shall include the required disclosure of tho Sales 
Executive as principal, further disclosure that the Sales Executive is "acting in his own behalf and not in a capacity as a Sales Executive for Wardley Better I lomes and 
Gardens" and that no commissions are being paid to either Wardloy Better Homes and Gardens or to tho Salos Executive In the transaction. Tho Sales Executive may 
proceed with the purchase without the Broker, but all documents, including loan and closing documents shall be submiitod to the Brokor to become a part of Broker's business 
files. Failure to comply with this provision shall be cause for immodinio termination and the payment of a 6% commission by the Sales Executive to Wardloy Bettor I lomos and 
Gardens. 
11 . Sales Executive acknowledges that Broker is the sole owner of all listings, rights and claims arising or in connection with the real property transactions which are the 
subject hereof and documentation relating thereto; and Salos Executive is a subsequont only to Broker. In the event of a dispute with a third party concerning payment of any 
commission, Broker shall have the sole right to nogotialo any settlement or to tako, or defend any logal actions; and all such actions shall be maintained only in the name ol 
the Brokor. All costs and attorney teos of any kind incurrod in such disputos shall bo paid by the partios heroto in tho same proportions as thoy were entitled to the commis-
sions. 
12. Sales Executive shall pay atl of the costs of the Sales Executive's own real estate license and dues, foes and other expenses for service and/or membership in the 
National Association of Roaltors, Utah Association of Realtors, and tho applicable local Board ol Realtors, and MLS Service Broker agrees to maintain a membership in the 
Multiple Listing Service for the Sales Executive's markot area. Sales Executive agrees to pay all foos and dues immediately when due and authorizes Broker to deduct any 
unpaid duos, fees or misc. expenses from commissions duo him/her without prior approval. 
13. Broker shall have the sole right to cancel a Listing or release a seller from a Listing contract on any property at any time by written notice to the Salos Executive and 
the seller. 
14. Sales Executive agreos that any and all listings of properly shall bo taken by tho Sales Executive In the name of the Broker. Such listings shall be filed with the 
Broker within twenty four (24) hours of receipt of same by tho Sales Executive. AH listings shall be and remain the separate and exclusive property of the Broker unless 
otherwiso agroed upon by the parlies heroto. In tho event of termination of this Agrooment, for any roason whatsoever, nil such listings shall remain in the name of. and be tho 
property of Broker. Sales Executive agrees, in the event of termination not to take any action to interfere with the continuation of such listings, or to otherwise interfere with the 
relationship between the listing party and the Brokor, and shall not attempt to induce the listing party to roquost a roloase of Broker's listing. In the event of release of listing 
party from the listing agreement with Brokor, and in the further event that said listing party then entors into a listing contract with Sales Executive or a Brokor with whom Salos 
Executive has placed his/her license, and upon a sale of the listed property within the original listing period, Sales Executive agrees to pay to Broker an amount equal to sixty 
percent (60%) of the total commission paid in connection with the sale. 
15. This Agreement does not constitute a hiring of oither party, or tho formation of a partnership or joint venture, parties hereto are and shall remain Independent con-
tractors, and the Saftos Executive will not be treated as an employee with respect to services performed by such Salos Executive as a real estate agent for federal tax 
purposes. Noithor party horoto shall bo linhlo for obligations or liabilities undorlaken by the othor party horoto, except as spocifically providod hornin. Wardloy nottor I lomos 
and Gardens/Broker shall not be subject to withholding for taxes or othor payroll itoms. Salos Executive shall be requirod to pay his/her own withholding and self employment 
taxes, all workman's compensation, to supply and pay for his/hor own transportation and alt other oxpenses Incurrod in Sales Executive's activities hereundor, excopt as 
otherwiso specifically providod herein. 
16. This Agreement and the relationship created horein may be terminated by either party hereto, with or without cause, at any time upon written notice given to the 
other, but the rights of the parties to any commissions which accruod prior to said notice shall not be divested by the termination ol this Agreement except as stipulated horein. 
Commissions shall not be deemed to have "accnied"' according to the terms of this paragraph, unless the transaction which towns the basis for the payment of the commission 
shall have beon "closed", and the Broker shall have been paid a commission thorofore, prior to the date of termination. 
17. Upon termination of this Agreement, the Sales Executive shall immedintoly return to the office all keys, equipment, signs, lock boxes, supplies and reference 
material belonging to the office, and satisfy any dobts or obligations which may bo outstanding to the Brokor. 
18. Any sates transaction in process (under contract but not yet dosed) at limo of termination, lor which a commission has not beon disbursod, at tho Broker's option, 
will be paid up lo the rate of one hall in accordance with the Brokor's 'Annual Graduatod Commission Schedule for Roaltors ' in elfoct at limo of termination, upon closing of 
the transaction and receipt of the commission therefor by the Broker. Real estate listings credited to the Sales Executive during his/her period of association with the Broker 
shall remain the sole property of the Broker after termination, and shall not entitle the Sales Executive to any commission or other compensation therefor. Any transactions 
started or revived by other Sales Executives after a terminated Sales Executive has left the association with the Broker are considered new transactions and the doparting 
Sales Executive shall not be entitled to any portion of the commission generatod thereby, and shall not otherwise have any interest in such transactions. 
19. Upon termination of this Agreement it is agreod that the Sales Executive shall not furnish to any person or entity engaged In the real estate business any 
information as to the broker's clients, customers, prices, terms of negotiation, nor Brokor's policies or relationships with clients or customers nor any other Information 
concerning the Broker and/or his business. 
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20 This Agreement Is persona) and may not be assigned, sold or othorwlse convoyed by oithor parry without the wrirton consent of the other. 
2\. The failure of any party to enforce at any time any of tho provisions or terms of this Agreement shall not be construed to be a waiver of such provisions, nor the right 
of the party thereafter to enforce such term or provisbn. 
22. This Agroement and the attached exhibits contain the whole of the Agroemont between the Sales Executive and the Broker. The terms hereof may not be altered, 
amondod, modified or changed except by an instrument in writing, signed by each of the parties hereto. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the terms of Broker's published Policy 
Manual shall govern the conduct and practice of Sales Executives, and any breach thereof shall be deemed to be a breach of this Agreement. 
23. In tho event that any torm, provision, or covonant of this Agroomont shnll bo dotorminod to bo void, unenforceable, and againsl public policy, or unconscionable, 
such findings shall not affect the other provisions contained herein, and this Agroement shall remain in full force and of led with respect to ail of the provisions, and the 
provisions so found to be void, unenforceable, and against public policy or unconscionable shall be doemod to be stricken herefrom without affecting the validity of the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
24. In the event of any disagreement or dispute between Brokor and Salos Executive arising out of this Agroemont, the prevailing party In such dispute shall be entitled 
to recovor from tho other party, all reasonable costs and expenses incurrod in connection with such disputo, Including but not limited to, court costs, roasonable attorney's 
foes, and oxpert witness foes, In addition to any damages resulting from breach of Oils Agreoment. 
IN WITNESS Wl lEREOP, tho pari|os have affixod thoir signatures tho day and yoar first above wrillon. ' •' U 
\ Sales Executive V 
j\ waraioy oeuoM-iomes una ua raens 
' ' Applicable Office f Dale / < f 
ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE^POUCfES 
t. The commission rates of our firm are based upon the cost of the services we provido, the value of these services to our clients and competitive market conditions. 
Our commission rates are not determined by agreoment with, or recommondation or suggestion from any person not a party to a listing agreement with our firm. 
2. Sales Executives affiliated with this firm shall not participate in any discussion with any person affiliated with or employed by any other real estate firm concerning the 
commission rates charged by this firm, or any other real estate firm in our community. 
3. When soliciting a listing, or negotiating a listing agreoment. no Salos Executive affiliatod with this firm shall make any reference to a "prevailing" commission level in 
the community, the "going rate," or any other words or phrases that suggest that commission rates are uniform or "standard" within our marketing area. 
4. The amount of subagency compensation, or "commission split," offered by this firm to cooperating brokers is determined by the level of service we can expect a co-
operating office to perform, and the amount of compensation necessary to induce cooperation under prevailing market conditions. Subagency compensation, or commission 
splits, are not intended, and may not be used, to induce or compel any other real estate firm in our marketing area to raise or lower the commission they charge to their client. 
5. When soliciting or negotiating a listing agreement, no Sales Executive affiliated with this offico shall disparage tho business practices of any othor real estate firm, or 
suggest that this offico, or any othor office, will not cooperate with any other real eslato firm. Listing presentations shall focus exclusively upon the level of sorvlce and 
professionalism provided by this office, the results we have achieved for other clients, and the value the client can expect to receive for the foe we charge Potential clients 
should be invited, and encouraged to compare the value of our service to those of any othor real estate firm in our market area. Likewise, any sales executive who is invited by 
a potential diont to compare our services with those of any othor reaf estate firm should do so by emphasizing tho nature and quality of the services we provide. 
6. Whenever a Salos Executive Is unsure about tho proper way to rospond to the concorns of an actual or potontial dient or customor. or whenever a Salos Executive 
has boon present during an unauthorized discussion of fees/commissions, Sales Executive should contact broker or office manager Immediately. If necessary, the broker or 
manager will consult our firm's attorney. 
I have read, understand, and agree to abide by, tho polides and procedures set forth above: 
SnlosExcculiv<\ \ \ Dato 
LISTING COMMISSION SCHEDULE 
MM iisimg contracts for improved residential property shall bo at a commission rate no loss than 6 percent of the gross sales price. 
AH fisting contracts for improved commercial property shall be at a commission rate no less than 6 percent of the gross safes price. 
All listing contracts for unimproved proporty shall bo at a commission rate no less than to percent of the gross sales price. 
All listing contracts for business opportunity properties where the sale of the real estate is or is not included shall be at a commission rate of no less than 10 percent of 
the gross sales price. 
With rospect to listings of multiple properties, corporate, third party or other unusual transactions, consult your managor before signing. 
3 
m no event shall a Wardley Better Homes and Gardens Sales Executive charge loss than th© commission rate established by the Broker without prior written agreemont 
on'©red into betwoen the Broker or Manager and the Sales Executive to that effect. If the applicable commission rate X the sates price shall be less than (1,000, the 
commission shall be $1 000 unless approved lor less 
This commission schedule Is applicable only to Wardloy Bettor I lomes and Gardens and is not to be shared or discussed with representatives of any other company. 
With respect to other brokers' listings, Sales Executive's commission inquiries must be limited to asking the amount of the cooperative brokerage fee to be paid to Wardley 
Better Homes and Gardens on the cooperative transaction. In responding to inquiries from other brokers or associates as to cooperative commissions on Wardley Better 
Homes and Gardens listings, Sales Executives must only advise the other brokers or associates of th© cooperative commission to be paid to the other broker on the* 
cooperative transaction 
ANNUAL GRADUATED COMMISSION SCHEDULE FOR REALTORS 
Qualified Earnings Previous 4 Quarters In I lot F A Cross Board 
Commission Commission 
Entry Level Commission — - $ 0 0O0 to $ 7,500 50% 50% 
Graduated commission 
Slop | . . - . - -. . — . - . . - - - % 7,500 in $?0 000 - -• -• - - .....-/*-—60% 50% J 
Step 2 — -• — - —.—. .- $20,000 to $30,000-.—----« .—- . .— . -6Ffv% 52.08% 
Step 3 - - - $30,000 to $40,000 - 67.5% 56.24% 
Step 4 - - $40,000 to $50,000 75% 62.5% 
Slop 5 - • tliO 0O0 and Above -- - . . . . 80'^ 66 66% 
I'araduateii Commission Schedules are based upon o Sales rxaculivo'e dollar volume* podormanco duunp thu previous tour quarters end! will be adjusted accordingly. Lach 
Saloii Executive1 must bo cerlifted as a graduate of Iht, Broktki"i 1 raining Program U'lorr advancing to Slop 1 of the Graduated Commission Schedule. 
Expenses to be deducted from the gross Wardley ncttor I lomcs and Gardens cornmi'jiiiun before disbursement in accordance with the above schedule includes a f % rharge 
for Better Homes and Gardens service and special advertising support. 
REFERRAL COMMISSIONS offer an additional source of income lor Sales Executives who receive commissions for. (1) clients and customers they reler to other Broker 
offices through our Wardloy Bettor Homes and Gardens Referral Office, and (2) clients and customers they service who woro referred to them Irom our Wardloy Bettor Homes 
and Gardens Referral Office Commissions received by Sales Executives are as follows' 
OUTGOING REFERRALS: Wardloy Bettor I tomos and Gardons Roforr.nl Offico receives 65% of the amount that tho Better Homes and Gardens Referral Center receives 
which Is 25% of the listing / selling commission. Sales Executives referring tho buyor or sellor.recoivos 60% of that amount roceivod by the Wardley Bettor I lomes and 
Gardens Referral Offici1 
INCOMING REFERRALS: Wardley Botter Homes and Gardens Roferral Office submits 25% of the listing or selling commission to tho Better Homes Rnd Gardens Relorral 
Center, After deducting a 6% marketing fee th© Sales Executive receives the Referral Office commission split. 
"IN-HOUSE COMMISSION" is based on the Sales Executive listing and selling a Wardley Botter Homes and Gardens property (both legs of the transaction). Sales 
Executives receive the percentage shown of tho total commission received by tho Broker. When one Sales Exocutive had the listing and another Sales Executive made the 
sale, each receives one half of the published percent for their own Slop rate, 
"CROSS BOARD COMMISSION" is based on Wardley Better Homes and Gardens Sales Executive listing or selling a property and another Salesperson from another Broker 
company having the other leg of the transaction. The percentage shown for tho Wardley Bettor I lomes and Gardens Sales Executive Is the percent of the commission 
received by Wardley Botter I tomes and Gardons 
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IJ\! THE f l S T R i r T COT.TP'T1 i\F THE THJ Rl i TODICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
i -: \ -, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 990912516 
vs : 
WARDLEY CORPORATION, a U t a h ; 
c o r p o r a t i o n , d b a WARDLEY BETTER 
HOMES & GARDENS, : 
D e f e n d a n t . : 
Before the Court is a Notice to Submit for Decision on 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court having heard 
argument of counsel and having further reviewed the pleadings filed 
: "---' -: d enters the following ruling. 
1. As the plaintiff's breach of contract claim, the 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. The plaintiff 
has disputed in her Affidavd t that she received the appropriate 
amount of commission for the sale of the property at issue. While 
defendant is accurate that plaintiff has not identified the amount 
of her damages at tl i:i s ti me, for purposes of Summary Judgme nt the 
plaintiff need only raise a factual issue, which she has done in 
her Affidavit,therefore, the defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment: . denied as to tl lat claim. 
2. As to the plaintiff's claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the defendant's Motion for 
YOUNG V. 
WARDLEY CORP. PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
Summary Judgment is granted. P] aintiff's claii i i - _. ..use of 
action i s based upon her argument that defendant failed to 
adequately pursue the balance of her commission from the seller of 
the property. However, the clear language of the Agency Agreement 
entered into between plaintiff and defendant indicates that all 
decisions regarding col ] ect:i ons on commissions shall be made by 
defendant. Those decisions include defendant's right alone, to 
negotiate a settlement or engage in legal action. As a result, the 
plaint, i f f ' s c ] a :i r r t,s t: ha t War dl ey did. not d : > enoi lgl 1 t o pursue 
comm~^ the contract places 
all rights and duties with regard to such actions in the hands of 
defendant. Based \ lpon that:, tl: ic defendant ' s Moti on for Summary 
Judgment as to that cause of action is granted. 
Counsel for defendant is directed to prepare an Order 
.consist ent \ ;i th 11 lis r ul i ng . 
Dated this / IL day of February, 2 0 04 
V L A ^ ^ V C?C* <*— A^LJ^^<^x 
SANDRA N. PEULER ~ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
YOUNG V. 
WARDLEY CORP. PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this { C— day of 
February, 2 004: 
Delano S. Findlay 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
6713 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
R. L. Knuth 
J. Angus Edwards 
Attorneys for Defendant 
170 S. Main, Suite 1500 
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01* OCT 27 PH ^ : 10 
R.L. Knuth (USB #3625) 
J. Angus Edwards (USB #4563) ••; ALT LAKE DEPARTMLH! 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
BY [JEPUTY CLERK 
Attorneys jor Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 




WARDLEY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, dba Wardley Better Homes & 
Gardens, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
RENEWED MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990912516 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
. .!ii :r:j:;?' a"i ; rcLr. '>•.. • •> r •:. - „\ .-.- :. _.•• >'•••-. on Plaintiff s Supplemental 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. J. 
Angus Edwards of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough appeared on behalf of Defendant, and 
Delano S. Findlay appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. The Court, having considered the pleadings, 
affidavits, documents on file, memoranda, and argument of counsel, the Court being fully advised 
and good and sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant is 
entitled to partial summary judgment on its claim that Plaintiff is only entitled to an earned 
666577vl 
commission on the actual amount of property yi elded or the amount of commission received by 
Wardley Corporation, and it is further 
( )"RTYRRFD. that the foui corners of the Agency Agreement unambiguously and plain!} 
limits riaintin s commission to a percentage of the actual amount received from the seller at 
closing and not a percentage of an amount previously expected by Plaintiff, and it is further 
ORDERED, that Defendant's renewed motion for partial summary judgment is granted 
and the unambiguous terms of the Agency Agreement are enforced as written. 
DATED tins x day of Mo^MO^f 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
M 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
Third District Court Judge 
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ATTORNEY'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I or 
I, J. Angus Edwards, counsel for Defendant, hereby certify that on the N v day of 
October, 2004, more than eight days prior to submission to the Court, caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Order Granting Defendant's Renewed Motion forTartial Summary 
Judgment to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Delano S. Findlay 
Findlaw, LLC 
6713 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
J. \&*igus Edwards 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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